


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MARCH 9, 1978

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DIRECTOR TURNER w/Q & A's

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DIR. TURNER w/QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

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National Newspapers Association speech  
mailed to Mr. Oliver & Lt. Geoffrey Turner  
7 April 1978

ADMIRAL TURNER's REMARKS

TO

NATIONAL NEWSPAPERS ASSOCIATION

CIA AUDITORIUM

1530-1630, 9 March 1978

Good afternoon, I hope you enjoyed the film clip. I'd like to say that it is indicative of some of the new things going on around here that we have that available, because it was originally intended, when we made it, to be part of what you've heard of as the famous public tours of the Central Intelligence Agency that never took place. What happened was we wanted to open up to the public more so we decided we would explore this possibility. Some of your co-freres in the media community got hold of that information and published it as an established fact before it was in fact decided by us. We went ahead, developed the film, developed the procedures to have tours, experimented with families from the CIA, and found it was really just impossible in the space we had available and without tying our working operation here up completely to do that. But we have wanted to open up more and decided what we would do instead of having open public tours for everybody, was to be more receptive to inviting groups like yours here to be with us and we are delighted you're one of the first to share in this new program of greater openness, greater hospitality out here. I think it is important that we do share more of our intelligence community's activities with the public today than ever before.

several reasons--one is that intelligence is more important to all of us as a country and as citizens of the United States today than it has ever been. If you look back, we have come from an era of total military superiority to one of parity--or close to parity, something like that. Under these circumstances intelligence, the ability to know what the other fellow is doing, building, planning, is just much more important than when you had so much military power relative to anyone else in the world, it wasn't critical that you be at the right place at the right time, with the right thing. If you look back at the end of World War II, we were also the dominant political power in the world. Most everybody else in the smaller nations followed our lead. Today, can you think of even the most insignificant little nation in the United Nations taking the lead from anybody else? That is just not the tenor of the times. They are all independent and properly so. I'm not complaining about either of these changes, I'm just acknowledging the facts. We have to know more about what the attitudes, the outlooks, the aspirations of many other nations are if we are going to do the job our country needs to do as, of course, one of the leading powers in the world.

Thirty years ago we were economically independent. Today I hardly need mention that we are interdependent economically, as each of us looks at the temperature on our thermostat and thinks about the conditions in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. There is another reason we want to be more open and that is that

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in the last three and a quarter years, the intelligence community of our country has gone under a lot of public scrutiny and criticism, mainly in the media. Some of it justified, some of it probably not. But today, having been exposed so much by this period of investigations of the Church Committee, the Pike Committee, the Rockefeller Commission, and the many stories in the media. There are more questions in the American public's mind about what we are doing, how we are doing it, whether we are doing it well. I think it is up to us as part of the democratic institutions of our country to respond to those questions.

I'd like to respond to them today for you, by trying to describe four ways in which our intelligence activities in this country are evolving, are changing today from what they have traditionally been. I hope that in the process of doing this we'll get some flavor as to how we do go about our business, and then I would really like to stop and respond to your questions.

But first, and quickly, the product of intelligence is different today than it was 30 years ago last September when this Agency was founded. Look back. In those days we were primarily interested in military intelligence about the Soviet Union. We were concerned with their Eastern European satellites, and with China, and we paid attention every time they made a foray out in the Third World and attempted to establish a new position. But basically, what we were interested in, what our product was, was determined by where the Soviets were doing things and what they were doing.

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There was one other characteristic of it then which carried on for quite some time, because when the Soviets did make a foray out in the Third World this country turned to its intelligence community not only for information--intelligence about what was going on--but also they asked the intelligence community to do something about it; to help influence those events, and that's what we call covert political action. The Central Intelligence Agency was there in 1953 when the government changed from communist to democratic in Iran; in 1954 similarly in Guatemala; we were there as you all know in the 1960s in Cuba; we played an important and positive role in Vietnam and as recently as 1975 we were conducting political action in Angola, until the Congress decided that was not what the country wanted and ordered a cessation. But now look at how the world has changed since those early days, when our intelligence was driven largely by Soviet military considerations, to today.

Today, we can't be limited to the Soviet Union and a dozen or so other countries of primary intelligence focus. We have interchange, important relations of one sort or another, with most of the 150 some nations of the world. With most of those our relationship is not primarily about military matters, but economic and political. So if we are going to serve our decisionmakers, our policymakers in this government well, we in the intelligence community must be able to provide good information about a wide range of geographical areas, a large

number of these 150 some countries and about adiversity of topics, economic, political, as well as military.

Secondly, look at how it has changed with respect to the country's attitude towards covert political action. That is not something that the country feels it wants to do as much today as it did in the past. Beyond that, I would say to you that it is also, in my opinion, not as applicable, it's not as useful a tool in foreign policy today as it may have been in times past. So, there is much less emphasis in the Central Intelligence Agency today on covert political action than there has been heretofore. I don't say we should eschew that capability as a nation. There are times when it may be far preferable to sending in the marines; there are times when it may be the most appropriate vehicle, but it must be used judiciously and it must be used under very proper control. I'll speak a little bit more of those.

Let me move on first to the second major change in American intelligence that is going about today, and that's a new production line. We not only have a new product, but we have to produce it in a different way. Now the traditional intelligence production line has always been the human agent, the spy. You remember, Joshua sent two of them into Jericho before he marched around with his trumpets. The human agent has been the principal tool of intelligence ever since; at least until a decade or decade and a half ago, when we began a technological revolution in intelligence collection--collecting the data, collecting the information on which you build

intelligence estimates. We now have what we call technical means of collecting information that just bring in vast quantities of data. It's unbelievable sometimes how rapidly the data flow is increasing. Sometimes it almost swamps us, but now interestingly, this does not denigrate the role, the importance, the necessity of the traditional human intelligence agent. Because very generally, broadly speaking, what the technical collection systems tell you is what happened in this place or that yesterday or today. But they very seldom tell you what are they going to do tomorrow. When I take some of this vast quantity of data down and talk to one of our policymakers and say, look what just happened over here, they look at me and they say, Stan, why? why did they do that, or what are they going to do tomorrow. That, probing into what people intend to do, what their plans and thoughts are, is the forte of the human intelligence agent. So, the more we collect from the technical systems the more we must complement that with the traditional human intelligence systems.

But let me go back. The production line is different. It's now a meshing of a number of different types of intelligence collection machinery that must be kept well-oiled, must be well-organized, must be times and integrated, as distinct from a single piece of machinery that was the production line in the past. It takes different skills, different bureaucratic organizations, different outlooks, and we are in the process of adjusting to some of those changes. I know that in the

newspaper business it is always easy to make organizational changes, nobody resists any changes in the structure of your organizations or their titles, or roles, or salaries or anything else. But in the government bureaucracy it isn't quite like that. We have some problems when we want to make changes.

The third change, also causes us problems, because it is a starkly different one, it's what I started out by saying and that is the policy of openness. I think we have no choice but to be more open today. But there are risks in this, particularly when you remember that we are working against an implacable and secretive enemy, the KGB. But there are benefits in being more open because we are a democracy, and this organization, the rest of the intelligence organizations of our country, simply cannot survive, cannot obtain the support they need, unless the American people are behind them. The American people accepted intelligence five years ago, they accepted its necessity and its secrecy. But due to the questioning we've had, that no longer is the case. So we are opening up more, but let me not mislead you, there is no way we can open up totally. In intelligence, there are things you must do in order to collect the information you need, that simply can't be done if they are announced or known in advance. So we must retain a lot of secrecy.

There are two basic functions in intelligence, one is collecting information and the other is analyzing it, and

drawing conclusions from it because the best spy in the world seldom goes to the blackboard and says, I just got the following information and it's all there, it's absolutely incisive, and you believe it completely. No, you have to take that man's clue and this technical intelligence systems clue and your intuition and a few other things and you piece it together like a picture puzzle. That's the estimating, the analytic process. We can't tell you very much about the collection process, because if we have to collect it through intelligence it's generally because the other fellow doesn't want to give it out. So if you tell him how you're getting it, he turns it off. He can't always, but generally speaking there is a countermeasure for every measure in one degree or another. So, we have to be very tight about what we say, about how we collect information. People's lives are at stake, expensive technical collection systems that you and I have paid for as taxpayers are at stake. But when it comes to talking about our analysis, our estimates, our conclusions, we can share more. Now what we can't share is the unique information that gives our President, our cabinet officers, our military commanders, our ambassadors in the field, unique advantage because they have that information and other people don't know that they have that information. If you're sitting down to negotiate a new contract with your labor union and you know their negotiating position, you don't want to tell them that. It's the same way in the intelligence game.

So, we today, when we make an estimate, we look at it carefully and we say, if we took out of that the information about how we got the data, that we cannot afford to disclose, and we took out those pieces of intelligence that are very uniquely important to our country, would the estimate have enough substance left, would it be of enough value if published to help improve the quality of the national database on this topic. Would it aid the general public. If it does, we publish it. We have published about two studies, estimates a week in the past year. Did you hear about the one on our prediction of the world energy crisis situation last March that we published, which said that in the next four or five years we believe the world will want to take out of the ground more oil than it will be able to. We didn't say there isn't enough oil down there, we didn't say we were going to run out of oil. We just said that sometime between now and the mid-1980s there is going to be pressure on prices because the curve of demand is going up more steeply than the curve of supply can be made to go up in that time frame. If you look further out, that's another story. We published a study last spring about the world steel situation. It said, for instance, that there is no major steel producing country that is working at more than 75% capacity today. Many countries, particularly lesser developed countries, are bringing new steel producing capacity on line and we do not see in the four or five years any prospect that demand is going to rise sufficiently to take

advantage of the capacity that exists today, let alone that which is being added to the world's capacity. So, there is an interesting situation in the steel world. We have done one on international terrorism and its effect on American interests overseas, American business overseas. And we've done one just recently on the comparative costs of Soviet military expenditures, American military expenditures, and so on. We think all of these, we hope, are of some value and interest to the American public.

In addition, in a sort of Machiavellian way, I hope that publishing more of these studies is going to help us with the problem of security of the information we must keep secretive. Because obviously the risk in going to a policy of greater openness is that you will overstep the bounds, you will open the door a crack and secrets will leak out that you don't want leaked out. But another problem in keeping secrets, is when you have too many secrets it is difficult to keep them, because people don't respect that label. You know we label the top of the paper SECRET, TOP SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, BURN BEFORE READING, people don't respect those labels when everything is labeled something like that. So by reducing the corpus of classified information I hope to generate greater respect for what remains and a greater tightness which is very critical to our overall intelligence operation.

The fourth change is what is known as greater oversight. Now here we have a paradox, because when you have to operate

partially in secrecy you cannot at the same time have the kind of public oversight that we like as Americans over our national institutions. We want to be able to check on what's being done in the Department of Commerce or Department of Labor, or elsewhere, so that we know the government is being run in accordance with the constitution and the standards that have been established. You can't quite have that with intelligence. So what we have generated, I believe, out of these last three years of criticism, out of the crucible of this criticism, has been a process I label surrogate public oversight. You can't all oversee us completely, but you have surrogates; the President and the Vice President, very active participants in the intelligence process today. You have under the President a special board called the Intelligence Oversight Board, three distinguished citizens who report only to the President and whose only function is to check on me, to check on the intelligence operations, they are not beholden to me. Anyone in the intelligence community can go to them directly and say look, Turner is doing something wrong. They are very important as a reassurance. But most importantly perhaps we also have established in the last two years, two new committees in the Congress; one in each chamber, each dedicated to the oversight process. I report to them regularly and quite fully about our intelligence activities. There are new rules in this Executive Order Herb described to you which regulate this whole process, and establish checkpoints in which

I must go through the Attorney General and other checkpoints where I must go through the National Security Council in order to be sure there is a harmony between the national policy and the intelligence activities; in order to ensure that these intelligence activities are conducted with the full regard for the rights and privileges and the privacy of the American citizen. I think the process is a good one. It's still evolving, the Congress is now working on legislative charters for the intelligence community. They will codify some of the things that are in the Executive Order that the President recently signed and they will set forth, in law, the rules for operating our intelligence community.

Now, there are clearly risks in this. If there is too much oversight, too many people get in the act, there is too great a risk that there will be leaks of important information. If there is too much detailed oversight there will be risks that we will not be able to do the things that need to be done, we will be hamstrung. I would say to you in all candor, that I can't assure you today that those risks will not come true. It will take a year or two of working out this process with the intelligence committees and working with the intelligence oversight board and all these new regulations to find the right level; to find the right amount of oversight to assure the American public the right amount of freedom for us to ensure that we can do the job that is necessary, in my opinion, to protect you, the American public, also. We as citizens all need to be sure that our policymakers have the best information

upon which to make the decisions for all of us. I am confident in my mind that this process will work itself out well, but it isn't there yet and I think you will enjoy over the next several years watching it evolve because it is a very important process for each of us. I can only assure you that I believe we have today the best intelligence activities, the best intelligence capabilities in the world. I assure you I intend to do all I can in the years ahead to keep it that way. Thank you.

Q: Inaudible

A: No. I have taken the position and the President has taken the position with the Congress that if they would like to release a single budget figure for the total intelligence activity--not the Central Intelligence Agency but the Defense and other activities thrown in, that's all right with us. But we are strongly opposed to releasing more than one figure, because then other people begin to see when your concentrating in this area, or your concentrating in that area and the countermeasures are developed more readily. The reason we don't release the single figure even though we think that can safely be done, is that if we release the single figure and Congress decides to release two and three figures we feel we're in trouble. So, we must share with the Congress the responsibility for protecting a single figure if it is released. So we have passed our assent to them and they are debating it still and have been for some time.

Q: Inaudible

A: We're very dependent on receiving into the intelligence community in general, the CIA in particular, a modest number but a very high quality of young people every year. One of the things that I am doing out here is to emphasize the importance of our bringing in a steady flow every year. We've gone in humps and cycles. You've read about the dismissals and so on out here, the controversy, a large part of that is because we are congested at the top with wonderful people who have been here for 30 years, some of them--25 to 30 years. We have got to move them out to let the younger people in and create a steady flow. What do you do? If you want to be an intelligence officer you have to have a college degree. Generally speaking your chances go up considerably if you have a masters degree and several years of working experience. You see, we are taking young people, giving them courses of training and then putting them in positions of immense individual responsibility. It's not like a football team when you have a coach right there on the bench, you've got to shoulder it yourself out in the field. So, we are looking for people with a little of that added maturity. We take a number of people in the broad general arts. We have a lot of positions here for people with specific technical skills, all sorts of them, everything from specific technical skills, all sorts of them, everything from psychology, to physics to chemistry, to biology and all the way down the line. So, specifically, if you're talking to a young person, study what you want to study, study what you're good at. Prove yourself not only to be good at it, but also to be a sort of imaginative leader.

Somebody who is interested in breaking new ground. Get a little experience, call up the nearest CIA office (we are listed in the telephone book in 39 cities); write to me here at the CIA in Washington, D.C., and we will get someone out to talk to you.

Q: What is the basis for reports that you are having difficulty recruiting young people right now?

A: No basis. The only shortcoming, or only change that I have been able to detect is that there's been such a bias built up against intelligence in the Eastern seaboard and some on the Western seaboard, at the most prestigious academic institutions that we are not getting as many people from them as before. But the number of applicants, the quality of applicants, is great. We're out at a hundred and forty or fifty campuses with our table and our recruiting booth openly every year. We are very pleased with the quality of people that we are getting as applicants. We take one out of ten or something like that and I'm proud that the young people in the country have seen through some of the false criticisms of us and are willing to recognize the importance and the challenge of being in an organization like this.

Q: After observing the Soviets pencil names off visa lists, would I be correct in saying that they have a file of Americans and determine who they might have in their country and who they would not like to have?

A: Oh, I would think so, yes. But recognize too that there are people we don't give visas to as well. I would think they are probably much more rigorous about this and keep dossiers on a lot more of us than we do of other people. We are more interested in criminals and that kind of thing. Yes, you know it is just not an open society over there and the amount of cost and effort that they put into keeping track of people who do come to their country is just prodigious.

Q: If you had to go outside your own building here to check the security of those of us who have applied....

A: No, we made no check on you. Now, I'll level with you on how we go about this because we had a group that wanted to come out here and I was going to talk to them a couple of weeks ago. It happened to be an international group and we said no because we just didn't want to go through the expense and effort of having to recheck this place afterwards that they didn't put a microphone or something down here. We take a chance with you because although we gather you are all Americans, any one of you could be

working for the KGB. We certainly hope not, but we check this place every so often. But we limit ourselves on the degree of risk we'll take by not having people who are not citizens or Americans come in here. I do not work in the United States and I have no authority to check on you, to run any kind of a check on you, unless you apply for work here. I am entitled to check the people who are going to possibly come to work here, and I think that makes eminent sense. But we are a foreign intelligence operation and the province of checking on Americans to the degree that the law permits that is that of the FBI, not of myself. No we've done no checking.

Q: Would you make some comments about the recent book by a former CIA....

A: Yes. The one in controversy is Mr. Snepp's book, which is before the courts and I have to be careful of what I say because I don't want to prejudice the case in the courts. But when you come to work for us we ask you to sign a secrecy agreement--an oath which says that when you leave here you will check with us before publishing a book or something of that size or shape so that we can not censor you and your ideas, but check on whether you are putting classified information out. Mr. Snepp signed such an agreement. When he came back from his duties in Vietnam he resigned from the Agency and announced that he was going to write a book. Last May 17th he came to see me in my office and wanted some help in getting some documents to help him with his book. I obliged him, I asked him looking him in the eye, will you give us your book for clearance? He said yes he would. He walked out the door and I tore up the piece of paper which was a draft requesting the Attorney General for an injunction against the publishing of his book because we suspected he was not intending to let us see it in accordance with his signed secrecy oath. I took him at his word, I made a mistake. He was not an honorable man in that regard. He published a book in a surreptitious manner and we feel that that is injurious to our interests and it is a breach of contract, and we have taken it to court in that respect. I think I'd better not say more or I will get into the court case.

Q: Inaudible

A: That's a very good and honest question. Could we combine the CIA, the FBI, and some other agencies and save money by doing the job better? In most countries of the world the FBI and the CIA type activities are combined in one. There might be some economies here but we feel that it's important in our democracy and under our constitution to keep law enforcement separate from intelligence activities. The law enforcement people do need to sometimes spy on Americans. They go out and they try to find out what a murderer is doing or where he is or how they locate him or a kidnapper who has a child or something like this. Calling it spying is a little different word than they use but it's basically looking into the activities of American citizens who are breaking the law. We think there should be very tight controls over looking into the activities of American citizens for the purpose of intelligence. Even though there is a lot of information there that could be of use to us in a very genuine proper way, we don't want to do that. We sacrifice that because none of us want to have our privacy invaded and that's where we came from in 1776 and that's the constitution and so we pay maybe a small expense for protecting that right by keeping these separate. But I would assure you, and your question is very good, that we work very closely with the FBI. So I think there's a minimum of extra cost or expense to this. We have a very good and close relationship.

Q: Admiral Turner.....different ground....what are employees chances to do some damage to the nuclear arms which involves the military, involves the safety of all of us, involves our foreign....interests--what intelligence service broke down in that situation?

A: Well it really isn't an intelligence service, that's the basic physical security service in the United States Air Force. They have their own responsibility to protect their equipment. You can call it intelligence in the sense that they try to keep security around the place and they obviously have to be alert to anything they can learn about people attempting to penetrate it. But in a strict technical sense that does not come under my cognizance as the Director of Central Intelligence who coordinates all the intelligence activities in the country, that's a security function.

Q: There was a recent story in Reader's Digest regarding increased activity of the KGB in the United States. Would you care to remark on that?

A: Yes, I believe there is increased activity of the KGB here. There are benefits to a greater policy of friendship and openness with the Soviet Union and there are some risks. There are many more Soviets who come to this country today than in years past. We have exchange agreements, scientific exchange agreements, for instance. We have lots of Soviets ships coming here, merchant ships with sailors on them, and each one of these because of the nature of the Soviet Union, is an opportunity for them to put a KGB agent ashore over here in the guise of one of these other legitimate activities. We believe that kind of activity has increased a great deal in recent years. It causes the FBI considerable problems, because it's their responsibility in the United States to monitor that kind of thing. It's my responsibility outside the United States.

Q: Admiral, I'd like to have a.....biography..... show who what and ....come face to face with people who are representing...inaudible..I would like to ask a question in the same vein and that is how does a small newspaper publisher ....am themselves with intelligence matters such as SALT II to talk to .....call Reader's Digest, call the New York Times, or where does he go to find the basis for an editorial ....which in turn may have an effect on....where does he go?

A: First, thank you Rog. I appreciate the plug and we really enjoyed those military--media conferences which we held at the War College. We got all spector of media to come up, some of the most liberal and some of the most conservativve. We had a day and a half of discussion and debate between military officers from all three services and the media. It made some sparks but it was good, certainly for us, and I hope it was of value to members of the media to see the military attitude towards some of these questions. You pose a most difficult issue as to where you get the most authoritative information on the issues of national importance so that you can transmit the right communications to your readers. I just can't give you a very simple answer. I can say that by publishing over a hundred unclassified Central Intelligence Agency studies in the past year, I hope I am helping you. You can subscribe to everything we publish by going to the Document Exchange at the Library of Congress and you can sign up for everything unclassified which the Central Intelligence Agency publishes. Of course cost would be proportional to the number we put out every year so I guess it's a running bill or something you get. Quite a few people including the Russian Embassy, do this. They get two copies. Alternatively, when you hear we publish something

you can send to the Library of Congress for that individual item and then not have the expense of all of them. That's a drop in the bucket to the total problem. It's my attempt to help you with this and its one of the reasons we are publishing more so that you can get the best information available and draw your own conclusions from it. Beyond that you've got the same old scramble between whose giving out the best material.

Q: All these years later there is still great skepticism about the Warren Commission's report on the CIA's involvement. Are you concerned about the public doubts about what the CIA did or did not do?

A: Yes, I'm concerned about any attitude in the American public that we have done or are doing something we shouldn't because we need your support. I have looked into that a fair amount since I've been here, I can't say that I've done an exhaustive search, but I assured myself that the Agency has done an exhaustive search in the past as to all the data on the Kennedy assassination. I also feel assured that everything of significance which we have on that has been passed to the appropriate law enforcement agencies in the executive branch of the Government and investigative committees in the legislative branch. So I think if there were any incriminating evidence that the CIA was involved in that plot in an improper way it would have been adduced by now. In short, I am confident that there was no such activity on the part of the CIA and as to having an official report on that, I'm willing to stand up and say that, I don't know what more I can do or should do. But we feel that everything we have that bears on that has been put forward and it does not involve the CIA in an improper way.

Q: Admiral, Now that the Nixon years are past, is it still possible for A. Halderman type individual to call you on the phone and direct you to spy on Americans or to assassinate a leader of a foreign country?

A: Of course, it's still possible that they can try it. It is more difficult because today there is a written directive to me, part of this executive order, and it was already in existence in an executive order that President Ford's had signed, that noone in the Intelligence Community will plan, contemplate or conduct an assassination, to answer that one specifically. I can still be fallible, mortal and give in to undue and improper

pressure. One would think it very unlikely that in turn I could get away with it with all the people I would have to involve in doing it let's say. Somebody is going to have a spy in this organization because there is a very express, signed by Jimmy Carter, order against that. Now, borderline things that are not that expressly forbidden, but clearly are not intended, yes, there can be pressures on me. All I can say is that you have to hope that the President appoints officials who are neither going to give those kind of orders nor take those kind of orders. You have to also have some reassurance that there is this oversight process whereby somebody, if they didn't have the spine to stand up to me if I relayed an improper order and say no, Admiral, you can't do that, would run around me to the Intelligence Oversight Board or to the Senate Select Committee or somebody and report the thing which would lead to an uncovering of it. In short, Bernstein and Woodward have been codified today, and fine. My objection with the Snepps and people like this is that they are blowing the whistle, I don't think he has anything much to toot about, but fine, he's entitled to blow whistles, but I'd be a lot happier if he tried to blow them to the oversight boards first, through the mechanisms that the country has established to provide that check and balance without thereby endangering the security issue at the same time.

Q: Admiral,...inaudible.....on American citizens late 60's and they were convinced at that time that the CIA was tapping the telephone lines of campus leaders and....Did you do that? And do you do that?

A: Yes, no. There were improper activities with regard to American citizens. We've recently been convicted in a court of opening mail. I've been ordered by the court to write a letter of apology which I have done in the three cases where there was a specific court conviction. So yes, there were some improper things done in the past with regard to surveillance of American citizens. No, we are not doing that now and yes, we have destroyed the files on that with some limitation because we've also had some rules put on us for other reasons that you can't destroy anything under certain categories and also there is just a manpower problem. We are not using those files and we are getting rid of them as fast as we legally can.

Q: Inaudible

A: The cuts have all been in the clandestine service and I over-simplified it. They were not only to make room for a flow of promotions, a flow of input, they were because we were overstaffed. And you can't attract good people in or keep good people in the middle grades when they are under utilized and over supervised, and that's where we were. And it's been acknowledged in this Agency for years and hardly anybody today, if you walk around the corridors would question, no matter how much he might have disliked the cuts, particularly if he were cut, would question the need for having cuts. The analytic portion of the Agency has increased in size during my time because I think we needed it. So we have taken the cuts where they were necessary in our opinion and we have increased where it's necessary. Finally, let me add that one reason the clandestine service particularly needed the cuts in order to provide this orderly progression is that in your business and almost any other, if all of your vice presidents retired at about the same time, you have a problem with your organization. But not an insoluble problem. You can go out and hire somebody from across the aisle here to come to work for you because you are all in the same basic business. But the only other organization in my business is the KGB.

Q: Your reaction sir, to our cohorts who seemingly spy on you and release information, meaning reporters and others who are assigned to watch your activities. Is this dangerous? Do you care to comment?

A: I'm always very concerned when the press gets hold of something that's very secretive and it becomes public information. But your job is to get information and to publish it. You have your own ethics, you have yours standards as to what you should publish and what you shouldn't. I pass no judgment on whether you should decide that this piece of information is too injurious to the country to publish or whether your responsibility to be a Bernstein and a Woodward overrides that and you should publish it. But I'm going to do everything I can to keep you from getting any classified information. I'm sorry everything I within the law and within the right procedures to keep you from doing it. I've taken some draconian steps since I've been here to prevent leaks. But that's the complementary part to the greater openness.

Q: Because the souls of the nations of the world are virtually open to you essentially, what kind of security do you have? What is your personal life like?

A: I don't have personal concerns with security, me personally. I've been here 365 days today and I've had no cause for alarm of any sort. I do have an Agency security man who travels with me when I go around on my appointed rounds in the city. It's partly for security against any possible threat, but I frequently shake my tail and don't use him. I act like a normal citizen on Saturday night, I take my wife and get in the car and go to the movies or whatever. I don't have any concerns. When I travel abroad, I'm a little more cautious. We don't publicize where I'm going to go because of the terrorist fanatics and things around the world. But, no, I don't have any particular concerns. Besides, I'm so busy at night reading more material that I don't have much time to get exposed.

Q: Last year we were under the impression that the Soviet Union was having a bumper crop and therefore it seemed to drive our farm prices down. When the prices were driven down the announcement was that the crops were not so good and they were able to buy our surplus at a lower price. Did you provide information that was incorrect?

A: Yes, we provided information that was incorrect, we're sorry. We missed by 10% our estimate of the Soviet grain harvest. We've only been in the grain harvesting business five years. It's typical of the expansion of our effort and there's some things happened this year that the formula we use didn't work as well as it should have. We're sorry. We also predicted and passed out information that the Soviets were entering the grain market and were going to buy grain. We didn't necessarily associate that with a lower harvest, although that seems logical. But prices were down in August, and it was possible they were buying for their stockpile not because they needed it to meet a lower harvest. In fact, we think that may still have been it, because they had a very bad weather situation in September and the Department of Agriculture frequently misses the U.S. forecast by 5%. So I'm not trying to excuse it, I'm not trying to say we won't do better but we also think we did not see a major increase in the price when the Brezhnev made his announcement. And of course, everybody believes the Brezhnev and not me. But because we had conditioned all the grain markets to the fact that the Soviets were in the market and were likely to be in it more.

Q: Inaudible.

A: Yes, the 39 offices we have across the nation are there to be our contact with the American public. They are there to be the place that any one of you may go and say I'd like to volunteer some information that I have which I believe is important to our government. They do go out and contact American citizens, American business, whom we think have information and ask would you please--I'm from the CIA--here's my credentials, would you please talk to me about your trip to the Soviet Union and so forth. It's perfectly open and above board. The last thing I ever want to do is to send a spy on a risky, chancey, expensive operation to collect information which is sitting in Keokuk, Iowa.

Q: Inaudible.

A: Well, I'm not sure its 95% of our problem but that's a much broader policy issue. We, of course, are now able to go to the Soviet Union much more as average citizens, and I personally think that a policy of greater openness between nations will benefit the open society like ours, much more than it would a closed one. Yes, they will gain more intelligence from us by coming here but the opening up of the Soviet Union, which is so tightly closed, is going to have a major impact on them, much more, I think, than their ability to penetrate us by spies.

Q: What is the status of the relationship between the CIA and the FBI.

A: CIA/FBI Relationship. There's no question that what you're referring to is that in the last part of J. Edgar Hoover's term there was a bad relationship between the FBI and the CIA. It had in my opinion been quite completely corrected before I got here. I've had very good relationships with Clarence Kelley. I've watched and I've seen the liaison between our working level people as being very good. It just so happens that the President picked a new Director of the FBI who was a college classmate of mine and a good friend at college, and I have my first business meeting with him next Monday at lunch and I look forward to that happenstance of personal relationship being a good opportunity to insure the same strong, warm relationship. It's very important to the country. We overlap in what's called counterintelligence, finding out who and how is spying against us. They do it inside, we do it outside. So when a spy goes from a foreign country to ours we have to pass the ball off between us, so coordination is critical.

Q: Admiral, I hope it's not a three-martini lunch.

A: Neither one of us happen to drink as a matter of fact.

Q: I've been reading a lot in the press today about the oncoming strength of the Soviet Union in the naval portions. Would you care to comment on this?

A: The Soviet Union over the past several decades has really put a major emphasis on its naval power. It has built from an insignificant naval force in the early 50's to a very, very credible one today. I don't think it's the number one navy by any question, we still have the most powerful and the most effective navy. But why have they made this major investment--a land power not dependent upon sea lines of communication as are we. I think primarily because they want to be a superpower, an international power in every department and because they see that they cannot really project their national power away from the physical borders without this ability. They are building up their merchant marine also to carry their trade and they are building up their navy to support it and to project the Soviet influence abroad.

Q: Admiral, we appreciate your time.

NATIONAL NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION  
Thursday, 9 March 1978, 1530-1630  
CIA Auditorium

- Show tour film
- Hope you enjoyed film
  - made for our tours
  - will use for special groups, but
  - no public tours
  - our experiment with tours underlined out conviction that important for American public to know more about intel organization and operation in this country.
- Want to tell you briefly about changes in IC then answer your questions.
- Pleased you are interested - to come here - intel product more important today than since Agency founded 30 years ago.  
Look at traditional things we do:
  - First collect military intelligence
    - 30 years ago dominant
    - since then Soviets can't compete economic and political spheres - resort to military
    - military equality
    - intelligence gives advantages - leverage
    - if know about enemy forces and intentions, can build/deploy forces better
    - SALT - better negotiating

- Second - political sphere same
  - 30 years ago dominant
  - today - interdependent
  - small nations used to follow our or Soviets lead
  - small nations now - irrespective of GNP or military strength, go own way
  - if we want to play a role must know attitudes - problems - plans
- Same with economics -
  - Today if Soviet Union, Japan, EEC take dramatic action - affects USA/our pocketbooks
  - Need economic intel
  - Can warn policymakers
- In addition to increasing importance, another factor shapes our attitudes
  - Since '74 - intense criticism in media
  - Much criticism destructive
  - Now turning corner - constructive
    - recognize need for intel
    - looking for ways to have good intel - at same time
    - preserve rights
    - reflect moral standards
    - keep within proper bounds

- This shaping intel ops - changes in 4 main areas:

1. Product -

-1947 product - mil intel only

- Soviets & Satellites only

-1947 - influence events - covert action

Iran '53, Guatemala '54, Cuba '61 +,

Vietnam, Angola '75

-Today - 150 + countries - interested in

all/broader scope

- need economic/political intel

- less covert action

- still have but less useful  
today

- better controls

2. Second change - Production line

-traditional - human spy

-Jericho

-last decade & half - technological revolution

-tech - tells today/yesterday

-increases need for human spy

-complimentary

-this change requires change in style,  
attitudes, methods - new skills

3. Third major adaptation - openness

-no choice but to be open

-difficult adjustment

-risks but advantages

-risks - against no holds barred: KGB

-strengths - support needed

-can't go totally public but we can talk about one of two fundamental things we do -

    °collection - no

    °analysis - yes

-Can't talk much about collection; - countermeasures

-Can talk about analysis - results

    -look at all studies - declassify - publish - 2/wk past year

    -March - world energy prospects - next 7-8 years can't produce what we need

    -Spring - world steel market - over capacity

-Terrorism - for Americans, increasing 40-60%

-Summer - Soviet Economy - real problems/choices will affect us - hard currency

-Hope studies informative - improve dialogue

    -good feedback

-Another reason to publish - reduce corpus of secrets - increase respect for rest.

4. Greater Oversight. New procedures - surrogates:

-President, VP - NSC -

-2 Committees Congress

-IOB

- New E.O. embodies these 4 directions I've described -  
I'd be happy to discuss in detail if interested.
- In essence E.O. will
  - 1. Strengthen our ability to do a good job.
  - 2. Ensure we do it IAW democratic standards  
of our society
- We have most effective IC in world today - new  
procedures will help us keep it that way.
- I personally assure you I am dedicated to that purpose.